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Abstract
We study a two-player, zero-sum, stochastic game with incomplete information
on one side in which the players are allowed to play more and more frequently. The
informed player observes the realization of a Markov chain on which the payoffs depend,
while the non-informed player only observes his opponent’s actions. We show the
existence of a limit value as the time span between two consecutive stages vanishes; this
value is characterized through an auxiliary optimization problem and as the solution
of an Hamilton-Jacobi equation.
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1 Introduction
This paper contributes to the expanding literature on dynamic games with asymmetric
information, in which information parameters change with time, see e.g. Athey and Bagwell
∗Ceremade, Universite´ Paris-Dauphine, Place du Mare´chal de Lattre de Tassigny, 75775 Paris cedex 16
(France). cardaliaguet@ceremade.dauphine.fr.
†Universite´ de Bretagne Occidentale, 6, avenue Victor-le-Gorgeu, B.P. 809, 29285 Brest cedex, France.
e-mail: Catherine.Rainer@univ-brest.fr
‡De´partement ESD, HEC Paris. rosenberg@hec.fr
§De´partement ESD, HEC Paris. vieille@hec.fr
1
(2008), Mailath and Samuelson (2001), Phelan (2006), Renault (2006), Wiseman (2008),
Neyman (2008) and more recently Escobar and Toikka (2013) and Renault, Solan and Vieille
(2012). In these papers, payoff-relevant types are private information, and follow Markov
processes.
The mathematical analysis of such games for a fixed discount factor δ remains beyond
reach, and all of the above papers (as well as most of the literature on repeated games, see
Mailath and Samuelson (2006)) focus on the limiting case where δ → 1, with the interpreta-
tion that players are ”very patient”. Yet, another, equally interesting interpretation which
is consistent with δ → 1 is that the players get the opportunity to play very frequently.
That the two interpretations may lead to sharpingly contrasted results was first pointed in
Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991) for repeated games with imperfect monitoring, see also
Fudenberg and Levine (2007) for a recent elaboration on this issue. Recently, this point was
also convincingly made in Peski and Wiseman (2012), which analyzes stochastic games with
frequent actions, and which contrasts results with those proven in Ho¨rner, Sugaya, Takahashi
and Vieille (2011) for stochastic games with patient players.
We here adhere to this alternative interpretation. Our goal is to clear the mathematical
problems in the analysis of the benchmark case of two-player, zero-sum games, and we revisit
the model of Renault (2006) as follows. The interaction between two players is affected by a
payoff-relevant type, which evolves in continuous time according to a Markov process (st)t≥0.
The two players choose actions at discrete time instants (called stages). Together with the
current type, these actions determine the (unobserved) payoff of player 2 to player 1. The
realizations of (st) are observed by player 1, but not by player 2, who only observes past
action choices of player 1. Players discount future payoffs at a fixed and common discount
rate r > 0, and the time span between two consecutive stages is 1
n
.
We prove the existence and provide a characterization of the limit value, as the time
span 1
n
goes to zero. While our setup is directly inspired from Renault (2006), our analysis is
significantly different. In Renault (2006), the transition rates between any two consecutive
stages remain constant when players get more patient. (At least when the process of types
is irreducible,) the initial private information of a player has a finite lifetime, and the limit
value does not depend on the initial distribution. Here instead, transitions rates are of the
order of 1
n
: as players play more often, the probability that the state changes from one stage
to the next vanishes. As a result, the limit value does depend on the initial distribution.
We first analyze the case of exogenous transitions (transition rates do not depend on
action choices). Adapting techniques from the literature on repeated games with incomplete
information, see Aumann and Maschler (1995), we give a semi-explicit formula of the limit
value as the value of an auxiliary optimization problem, which we use to get explicit formulas
in a number of cases. Using PDE techniques, we provide an alternative characterization of the
limit value as the unique solution (in a weak sense) to a non-standard Hamilton-Jacobi (HJ)
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equation. This equation can be understood as the infinitesimal counterpart of a dynamic
programming principle.
We next expand significantly this framework to allow first for endogenous transitions
(transition rates do depend on actions) and next, for incomplete information on both sides
(each player observes and controls his own Markov chain). In both settings we show that
the limit value exists and is characterized as the unique (weak) solution of a HJ equation.
Our techniques for this analysis (viscosity solutions of Hamilton-Jacobi equations, passage
to the limit in these equations) are reminiscent of the ones developed for differential games,
as in Evans and Souganidis (1984). However, because of the information asymmetry, the
Hamilton-Jacobi equation satisfied by the limit value takes the form of an obstacle problem,
much as in the case of differential games with incomplete information (Cardaliaguet and
Rainer (2009a), Cardaliaguet (2009)), yet with a significant difference. Indeed, information
is here disclosed to the informed player(s) through time (and not only at the initial instant);
this leads to a new HJ equation and to a slightly different definition of weak solution (cf. the
discussion after Definition 1 and at the beginning of the proof of the comparison principle).
The passage from discrete games to continuous equations partially relies on methods devel-
oped for repeated games in Vieille (1992), Laraki (2002), Cardaliaguet, Laraki and Sorin
(2012), and the starting point of our analysis for incomplete information on both sides is
inspired by Gensbittel and Renault (2012).
The paper is organized as follows. We first present the model and state the main results
(Section 2), which we illustrate through several examples in Section 3 and which we prove
in Section 4. Games with endogenous transitions are analyzed in Section 5, while Section 6
is devoted to games with incomplete information on both sides. In the appendix we collect
the proofs of several technical facts, including a new comparison principle adapted to our
framework.
2 Model and main result
2.1 Model
We start with the simpler version of the model. There is a finite set of states S of cardinal
|S|. With each state is associated a zero-sum game with finite action sets A and B and
payoff function g(s, ·, ·), where g : S × A × B → R. Time is continuous, and the state
st at time t ≥ 0 follows a Markov chain with law P, initial distribution p ∈ ∆(S) and
generator R = (ρss′)s,s′∈S. For s 6= s
′, ρss′ is thus the rate of transitions from s to s
′, while
−ρss =
∑
s′ 6=s
ρss′ is the rate of transitions out of state s. We denote by P (·) the transition
semi-group of (st)t≥0, so that Ph(s, s
′) = P(st+h = s
′ | st = s) for all t, h ≥ 0 and s, s
′ ∈ S.
3
The map t 7→ Pt is a solution to the Kolmogorov equation P
′
t = RPt, and is given by
Pt = exp(tR).
Given n ∈ N∗, we let Gn(p) denote the following, two-player game with infinitely many
stages. In each stage k ∈ N, players choose actions ak and bk in A and B, and the payoff
is given by g(s
(n)
k , ak, bk) where s
(n)
k := sk/n is the state at time
k
n
. Along the play, player 1
observes past and current realizations of the states s
(n)
k and both players observe past actions
of player 1, but payoffs are not observed.1
We view Gn(p) as the discretized version of a continuous-time game, with stage k of Gn(p)
taking place at physical time k
n
. As n increases, the time span between two consecutive stages
shrinks and the players get the option to play more and more frequently. In physical time,
players discount future payoffs at the fixed, positive rate r > 0. Hence, the weight of stage
k in Gn(p) is
∫ (k+1)/n
k/n
re−rtdt = λn(1 − λn)
k, where λn := 1 − e
−r/n. Note that λn → 0 as
n → +∞ (and 1 − λn may be interpreted as the discount factor between two consecutive
stages in Gn(p)).
We denote by v˜n(p) the value of the game Gn(p).
2 From the perspective of the literature
on repeated games, the game Gn(p) is thus a discounted game, with discount factor 1− λn.
2.2 Results
Our main result is the existence of limn→+∞ v˜n(p), together with different characterizations
of the limit. We need a few definitions.
Define S(p) to be the set of adapted, ca`dla`g processes (pt)t≥0, defined on some filtred
probability space (Ω,F ,P, (Ft)t≥0), with values in ∆(S), and such that, for each t, h ≥ 0,
one has
E[pt+h | Ft] =
T P (h)pt, P− a.s. (1)
Given p˜ ∈ ∆(S), we denote by u(p˜) the value of the one-shot, zero-sum game Γ(p˜) with
action sets A and B and payoff function
g(p˜, a, b) :=
∑
s∈S
p˜(s)g(s, a, b).
That is, u(p˜) = max
x∈∆(A)
min
y∈∆(B)
g(p˜, x, y) = min
y∈∆(B)
max
x∈∆(A)
g(p˜, x, y).
Theorem 1. The sequence (v˜n(·))n∈N converges uniformly, and P1 and P2 hold, with
v(p) = limn→∞ v˜n(p).
1Whether or not actions of player 2 are observed is irrelevant.
2We abstain from using the notation vn(p), which is associated with games with n stages.
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P1 v(p) = max
(pt)∈S(p)
E
[∫ +∞
0
re−rtu(pt)dt
]
.
P2 v(·) is the unique viscosity solution of the equation
min
{
rv(p) +H(p,Dv(p)) ; −λmax(p,D
2v(p))
}
= 0 in ∆(S), (2)
where H(p, ξ) = −〈TRp, ξ〉 − ru(p).
Few comments are in order. We first comment on P2, and on the intuitive content of
equation (2). Assuming v(·) (extended to a neighborhood of ∆(S)) is a smooth function,
Dv(p) and D2v(p) stand respectively for the gradient and Hessian matrix of v(·) at p, while,
loosely speaking, λmax(p,D
2v(p)) is the maximal eigenvalue of the restriction of D2v(p) to
the tangent space of ∆(S) (all formal definitions will be provided later). According to (2),
(i) −λmax(p,D
2v(p)) ≥ 0, so that the limit value v is concave. This concavity property—
which actually holds for each v˜n (thanks to the so-called splitting results, such as
Propositions 2.2 and 2.3 in Sorin (2002))—can also be established using P1.
(ii) the inequality rv(p) + H(p,Dv(p)) ≥ 0 always holds on ∆(S), with equality at any
point p where v is strictly concave (or, more precisely, at which −λmax(p,D
2v(p)) > 0).
It turns out that the Hamilton-Jacobi equation
rw(p) +H(p,Dw(p)) = 0, p ∈ ∆(S)
characterizes the limit value of the auxiliary game in which no player observes (st) – the
PDE actually being the infinitesimal version of the dynamic programming equation.
In our game, the equality rv(p) + H(p,Dv(p)) = 0 must intuitively therefore hold
wherever it is optimal for player 1 not to disclose information. For this reason, the set
H := {p ∈ ∆(S) | rv(p) +H(p,Dv(p)) = 0} (3)
is called the non-revealing set.
In general however, one cannot hope the limit value v(·) to be smooth. For this reason,
the interpretation of the equation (2) is in the viscosity sense, see Definition 1 in Section 5.
To illustrate P1, let us specialize Theorem 1 to the case where R is identically 0. In
such a case, the state s0 is drawn at time 0 and remains fixed throughout time. The game
Gn(p) thus reduces to a truly repeated game with incomplete information a` la Aumann and
Maschler (1995). Note that S(p) is then equal to the set of ca`dla`g martingales with values
in ∆(S) and initial value p.
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Consider two ∆(S)-valued processes (pt)t≥0 and (p˜τ )τ∈[0,1], such that p˜τ = p− ln(1−τ)
r
or
equivalently pt = p˜1−e−rt a.s., for each t ≥ 0 and τ ∈ [0, 1]. Observe that (pt) is a martingale
iff (p˜τ )τ∈[0,1] is a martingale, and
E
[∫ ∞
0
re−rtu(pt)dt
]
= E
[∫ 1
0
u(p˜τ )dτ
]
.
Therefore, denoting byM[0,1](p) the set of ca`dla`g martingales defined over [0, 1], with values
in ∆(S) and starting from p, one has
v(p) = max
(p˜τ )∈M[0,1](p)
E
[∫ 1
0
u(p˜τ)dτ
]
, (4)
a well-known formula for repeated games (see Section 3.7.2 in Sorin (2002)). In a sense, the
assertion P1 thus provides the appropriate generalization of (4) to the case of an arbitrary
transition rate matrix R.
P1 andP2 provide two alternative (and independent) characterizations of the limit value,
as the value of an auxiliary optimization problem, and as a solution to a Hamilton-Jacobi
PDE. We next state a verification theorem, which relies on P2 to give a sufficient condition
under which a process in S(p) is optimal in P1.
Theorem 2. Assume that v is of class C2 in a neighborhood of ∆(S). Let p ∈ ∆(S) and
(pt) ∈ S(p) be given, and assume that (i) and (ii) below hold.
(i) P-a.s., one has ps ∈ H and v(ps)− v(ps−) = 〈Dv(ps−), ps − ps−〉 for all s ≥ 0,
(ii) (pt) has no continuous martingale part.
Then (pt) achieves the maximum in P1.
Remark 3. As R is the generator of the transition semi-group P , (1) implies that each
process (pt) ∈ S(p) can be decomposed, P-a.s. for all t ≥ 0, as
pt = p+
∫ t
0
TRpsds+mt, (5)
where (mt) is a martingale in the filtration generated by (pt). This martingale itself can be
decomposed into a continuous and a purely discontinuous part (see Protter (2005)).
The most important condition in Theorem 2 is (i), which states that the “information
process” (pt) must live in the non-revealing set H and can jump only on the flat parts
of the graph of the limit value v(·); this condition is known to be sufficient in a class of
simpler games, such as in Cardaliaguet and Rainer (2009b). Condition (ii) is often satisfied
in practice, as the examples in the next section show.
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Proof. We write the Itoˆ formula for e−rtv(pt), using the decomposition (5):
e−rtv(pt) = v(p)−
∫ t
0
re−rsv(ps)ds+
∫ t
0
e−rsDv(ps−)dps +
1
2
∫ t
0
e−rsD2v(ps)d〈m
c〉s
+
∑
0<s≤t
e−rs (v(ps)− v(ps−)− 〈Dv(ps−), ps − ps−〉) ,
where (mct) is the continuous part of the martingale (mt) and 〈m
c〉 its quadratic variation.
Under the assumptions (i) and (ii), the two last terms in this equation vanish. Then,
replacing (pt) by its martingale decomposition and taking expectations on both sides, we get
e−rtE[v(pt)] = v(p)−E
[∫ t
0
e−rt
(
rv(ps)− 〈
TRps, Dv(ps)〉
)
ds
]
.
It is time now to apply the assumption ps ∈ H , which leads to
e−rtE[v(pt)] = v(p)− E
[∫ t
0
re−rtu(ps)ds
]
.
The result follows when letting t→ +∞.
3 Examples and Applications
We here illustrate how P1 can be used to provide explicit formulas for v(p) in various cases.
This section is organized as follows. We first provide in Lemmas 1 and 2 respectively upper
and lower bounds on v(·) which always hold. We next identify several cases where these
bounds coincide, thereby pinning down v(·). We finally discuss two examples in more detail.
3.1 Upper and lower bounds for the limit value
Let (p∗t ) be defined by p
∗
t =
T Ptp. The process (p
∗
t ) is the unique deterministic process
in S(p). It is the process of beliefs held by player 2 when player 1 plays in a non-revealing
manner (that is, ignores his own private information) or equivalently, the beliefs of an outside
observer who would not observe the informed player’s actions. Observe that E[pt] = p
∗
t for
every t ≥ 0 and (pt) ∈ S(p).
We denote by cav u := ∆(S)→ R the concavification of u(·).
Lemma 1. One has
v(p) ≤
∫ ∞
0
re−rtcav u(p∗t )dt.
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Proof. For any (pt) ∈ S(p), one has
E
∫ ∞
0
re−rtu(pt)dt =
∫ ∞
0
re−rtE[u(pt)]dt ≤
∫ ∞
0
re−rtcav u(E[pt])dt =
∫ ∞
0
re−rtcav u(p∗t )dt,
where the first equality follows from Fubini Theorem, and the first inequality follows from
the inequality u ≤ cav u and from Jensen inequality.
For s ∈ S, we denote by δs ∈ ∆(S) the probability measure which assigns probability
one to s.
Lemma 2. One has
v(p) ≥
∫ ∞
0
re−rtu(p∗t )dt,
and
v(p) ≥
∑
s∈S
u(δs)
∫ ∞
0
re−rtp∗t (s)dt.
Proof. These lower bounds for v(p) are obtained when computing E
∫ ∞
0
re−rtu(pt)dt for
specific processes (pt) ∈ S(p).
The first lower bound is obtained when setting pt := p
∗
t . Intuitively, the right-hand
side is then the amount which is secured by the strategy which plays at each t an optimal
(non-revealing) strategy in the average game associated with the current belief of player 2.
The second lower bound obtains when setting pt := δst . Indeed, one then has
E
∫ ∞
0
re−rtu(pt)dt =
∫ ∞
0
re−rtE[u(δst)]dt
=
∑
s∈S
u(δs)
∫ ∞
0
re−rtP(st = s)dt
=
∑
s∈S
u(δs)
∫ ∞
0
re−rtp∗t (s)dt.
Intuitively, the right-hand side is then the amount which is secured by a strategy which
would announce at each t the current state, and then play optimally in the corresponding
game.
Corollary 4. If u is concave, then v(p) =
∫ ∞
0
re−rtu(p∗t )dt.
If u is convex, then v(p) =
∑
s∈S
u(δs)
∫ ∞
0
re−rtp∗t (s)dt.
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Proof. If u is concave, then u = cav u, and the result follows from Lemmas 1 and 2 (first
lower bound).
If u is convex, then cav u(p) =
∑
s∈S p(s)u(δs) for each p ∈ ∆(S), and the result again
follows from Lemmas 1 and 2 (second lower bound).
We now illustrate in these two simple cases the alternative characterization P2 in Theo-
rem 1. If u is smooth and concave, then the map
w(p) :=
∫ ∞
0
re−rtu(p∗t )dt =
∫ ∞
0
re−rtu(TPtp)dt
is concave and satisfies
rw(p) +H(p,Dw(p)) = rw(p)− 〈TRp,Dw(p)〉 − ru(p) = 0.
Therefore w is a solution to the Hamilton-Jacobi equation
min
{
rv(p) +H(p,Dv(p)) ; −λmax(p,D
2v(p))
}
= 0 in ∆(S). (6)
By P2, this shows (again) that v = w. Recalling the definition of the non-revealing set H
in (3), we here have H = ∆(S). As the deterministic process (p∗t ) satisfies conditions (i) and
(ii) of Theorem 2, it is optimal in P1: in other words, player 1 does not reveal anything.
Assume instead that u is smooth and convex. Then the map
w(p) :=
∑
s∈S
u(δs)
∫ ∞
0
re−rtp∗t (s)dt
satisfies
rw(p) +H(p,Dw(p)) = r
∑
s
psu(δs)− ru(p) ≥ 0,
because u is convex. As D2w(p) = 0, w solves (6) (actually one has to be more cautious
here and to use the notion of viscosity solution of Definition 1). From this and P2, it follows
that v = w. Moreover, the non-revealing set is given by H = {p : u(p) = cav(u)(p)} and
thus contains S. Then the process (pt := δst) satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) of Theorem 2,
so that it is optimal in P1: player 1 reveals all his information.
In both the concave and the convex cases, v(p) is given by
∫ ∞
0
re−rtcav u(p∗t )dt. We
show that this latter formula is valid in many cases beyond the concave and convex case,
but not always.
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3.2 Two-state games
In the following, we focus on the case where S := {s1, s2} contains only two states, and we
identify a probability measure over S with the probability assigned to state s1. In particular,
u will be viewed as a function defined over [0, 1]. We denote by p∗∞ := limt→∞ p
∗
t ∈ [0, 1]
the unique invariant measure of (st), and let p, p¯ ∈ [0, 1] be such that p ≤ p
∗
∞ ≤ p¯, and
(p∗∞, cav u(p
∗
∞)) = α(p, u(p)) + (1− α)(p¯, u(p¯)), for some α ∈ [0, 1].
Such distributions p and p¯ always exist, but need not to be uniquely defined.
Lemma 3. Assume p < p∗∞ < p¯. One has
v(p) =
∫ ∞
0
re−rtcav u(p∗t )dt for each p ∈ [p, p¯]. (7)
If moreover the equality u = cav u holds on [0, p] (respectively on [p¯, 1]), then (7) holds on
the interval [0, p] (respectively on [p¯, 1]).
If we further assume that cav u is of class C1 with cav u(p) > u(p) in (p, p¯), then one can
easily check that the non-revealing set defined in (3) satisfies {p, p¯} ⊂ H ⊂ [0, p] ∪ [p¯, 1]. In
particular, (7) follows from the construction—in the proof below—of a process (pt) ∈ S(p)
such that pt ∈ {p, p¯} a.s.: this process satisfies (i) and (ii) of Theorem 2 (because v is affine
on [p, p¯]) and therefore is optimal in P1. If, moreover, the equality u = cav u holds in [0, p],
then one has [0, p]∪{p¯} ⊂ H. We show in the proof below that there is a process (pt) ∈ S(p)
with pt ∈ [0, p] ∪ {p¯} a.s.: the same arguments as above show that this process is optimal.
Proof. Define θ := inf{t : p∗t ∈ [p, p¯]}, the first time at which the “average” belief enters the
interval [p, p¯]. Note that θ < +∞ and that p∗t ∈ [p, p¯] for every t ≥ θ.
The result follows from the fact, proven below, that there is a process (pt) ∈ S(p) such
that pt = p
∗
t for t ≤ θ, and pt ∈ {p, p¯} for t ≥ θ, P-a.s. Indeed, for any such process, one has
E
∫ ∞
0
re−rtu(pt)dt =
∫ θ
0
re−rtu(p∗t )dt+
∫ ∞
θ
re−rtE[u(pt)]dt
=
∫ θ
0
re−rtcav u(p∗t )dt+
∫ ∞
θ
re−rtcav u(p∗t )dt,
which will conclude the proof of the lemma.
We now construct the process (pt). For t ≥ θ, define Qt :=
(
q11(t) 1− q11(t)
1− q22(t) q22(t)
)
by
q11(t) =
1
p¯− p
(
p¯−
(
p× p11(t) + (1− p)p21(t)
))
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and
q22(t) =
1
p¯− p
(1− p¯− ((1− p¯)p22(t) + p¯× p12(t))) .
Intuitively, Qt is the transition matrix between the two ”states” p and p¯ induced by Pt. To
see why, observe that, when starting from p, the probability of being in state s1 at time t is
pp11(t)+ (1−p)p21(t), which is equal to q11(t)p+(1− q11(t))p¯. Similarly, when starting from
p¯, the probability of being in s1 at time t is p¯p11(t)+(1− p¯)p21(t) = (1−q22(t))p+q22(t)p¯. An
elementary computation using the Kolmogorov equation P ′t = RPt yields Q
′
t = R˜Qt, where
the rate matrix R˜ =
(
−ρ˜12 ρ˜12
ρ˜21 −ρ˜21
)
is given by
ρ˜12 =
(1− p)ρ21 − pρ12
p¯− p
and ρ˜21 =
p¯ρ12 − (1− p¯)ρ21
p¯− p
.
Both ρ12 and ρ21 are positive. Therefore, there is a Markov process (qt)t≥θ with values in
∆({p, p¯}), with rate matrix R˜ and initial distribution qθ defined by p
∗
θ = qθ(p)p+ qθ(p¯)p¯.
By construction, the process (pt)t≥θ defined by pt := qt(p)p+ qt(p¯)p¯ is a Markov process
and E[pt+h | F
p
t ] =
T Phpt for all t ≥ θ, h ≥ 0. Set now pt = p
∗
t for t < θ. Then the process
(pt)t≥0 satisfies the desired properties.
In all previous cases, the equality v(p) =
∫ ∞
0
re−rtcav u(p∗t )dt holds. This is however not
always the case, as we now show.
Example: Let a game A, B and g : {s1, s2} × A× B be such that (i) u(0) = u(1) = 0, (ii)
u(p) = 1 for p ∈ [1
3
, 2
3
], and (iii) u is strictly convex on each of the intervals [0, 1
3
] and [2
3
, 1].
Assume that transitions are such that p∗∞ ∈ (
1
3
, 2
3
).3
Proposition 1. For every p /∈ [1
3
, 2
3
], one has v(p) <
∫ ∞
0
re−rtcav u(p∗t )dt.
Proof. Fix p ∈ [0, 1
3
) for concreteness. We argue by contradiction, and assume that∫ ∞
0
re−rtE[u(pt)]dt =
∫ ∞
0
re−rtcav u(p∗t )dt,
for some process (pt) ∈ S(p). Since E[u(pt)] ≤ cav u(p
∗
t ) for all t, one has E[u(pt)] = cav u(p
∗
t )
for Leb-a.e. t ∈ R∗.
3The existence of such a game follows from Proposition 6 in Lehrer and Rosenberg (2003), which does
not appear in the published version of the paper, Lehrer and Rosenberg (2010).
11
Let θ := inf{t : p∗t ≥
1
3
}. Observe that cav u(p∗t ) = 1 for t ≥ θ, and cav u(p
∗
t ) = 3p
∗
t for
t ≤ θ.
For t < θ, the equality E[u(pt)] = cav u(p
∗
t ) implies that the law of pt is concentrated
on {0, 1
3
}, with P(pt =
1
3
) = 3p∗t . As t → θ
− we get P(pθ− =
1
3
) = 1, so that pθ− = p
∗
θ a.s..
Then (1) implies that pt = (e
−TR(θ−t))p∗θ = p
∗
t a.s. for t ∈ [0, θ], which is impossible since
pt ∈ {0,
1
3
} a.s..
Intuitively, maximizing E[u(pt)] leads player 1 to disclose information at time t which he
later wishes he hadn’t disclosed.
3.3 An explicit example
We conclude this section by providing an explicit formula for the limit value in an example
due to Renault (2006) (see also Ho¨rner, Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille (2010)). In that
example, both players have two actions, and the payoffs in the two states are given by(
1 0
0 0
)
and
(
0 0
0 1
)
Transitions occur at the rate pi > 0, so that R =
(
−pi pi
pi −pi
)
. Observe that R =
M
(
−2pi 0
0 0
)
M−1, where M =
(
1 1
−1 1
)
, so that
Pt = e
tR =M
(
e−2pit 0
0 1
)
M−1 =
1
2
(
1 1
1 1
)
+
e−2tpi
2
(
1 −1
−1 1
)
.
Note that u(p) = p(1− p) is concave, hence
v(p) =
∫ ∞
0
re−rtu(p∗t )dt =
∫ ∞
0
re−rtp∗t (1− p
∗
t )dt. (8)
On the other hand, p∗t is given by
(
1− p∗t
p∗t
)
= P (t)
(
1− p
p
)
. Integration in (8) leads to
v(p) =
1
4
−
(2p− 1)2
4
×
r
r + 4pi
.
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4 Proof of Theorem 1
In this section, we prove P1. Statement P2 is a particular case of Theorem 7 below, and we
postpone the proof to section 5. The proof of P1 is divided in three parts. We first prove
that
lim inf
n
v˜n(p) ≥ sup
S(p)
E
[∫ ∞
0
re−rtu(pt)dt
]
,
and next that
lim sup
n
v˜n(p) ≤ sup
S(p)
E
[∫ ∞
0
re−rtu(pt)dt
]
.
We finally show that the supremum is reached.
4.1 Step 1
Let (pt) ∈ S(p) be arbitrary. We will prove that lim inf
n
v˜n(p) ≥ E
[∫ ∞
0
re−rtu(pt)dt
]
.
The proof will make use of Lemma 5 below. This lemma is conceptually similar to (but
technically more involved than) the elementary, so-called splitting lemma (Aumann and
Maschler (1995)) which we quote here.
Lemma 4. Let a finite set L, and a probability p ∈ ∆(S) be given, such that p =
∑
l∈L
αlpl,
for some α ∈ ∆(L) and pl ∈ ∆(S) (l ∈ L). Then there is a probability distribution P over
L× S with marginals given by α and p, and such that the conditional law of s given l is pl.
The usual interpretation of Lemma 4 is as follows. Assume some player, informed of the
realization of s, draws l according to P(l | s) and announces l. Then, the posterior belief of
an uninformed player with prior belief p is equal to pl. Lemma 4 formalizes the extent to
which an informed player can “manipulate” the belief of an uninformed player by means of
a public announcement.
Lemma 5 below is the appropriate generalization of Lemma 4 to a dynamic world with
changing states. Some notation is required. We fix a Markov chain (ωm)m∈N over S, with
initial law p ∈ ∆(S), transition matrix Π = (pi(s′ | s))s,s′∈S, and law P. Given a sequence
µ = (µm)m∈N, where µm is a transition function from (∆(S))
m × S to ∆(S),4 we denote by
µ ◦P the probability measure over (∆(S)×S)N which is obtained as follows. Together with
Π, µm induces a transition function νm from ∆(S)
m × S to ∆(S)× S defined by
νm(q
m, ωm; qm+1, ωm+1) = pi(ωm+1 | ωm)µm(q
m, ωm+1; qm+1). (9)
4We write µm(q
m, s; ·). Thus, µm(q
m, s; ·) is a probability distribution over ∆(S) for each given qm =
(q0, . . . , qm) ∈ ∆(S)
m, and s ∈ S, and the probability µm(q
m, s;A) assigned to a fixed (measurable) set
A ⊂ ∆(S) is measurable in (qm, s).
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The distribution µ ◦P is the probability measure over (∆(S)×S)N induced by the sequence
(νm)m∈N (by means of the Ionescu-Tulcea Theorem) and the initial distribution of (q0, ω0)
which assigns probability p(ω0) to ({p}, ω0) ∈ ∆(S)× S.
To follow-up on the above interpretation, we think of an uninformed player with belief
p over ω0, and of an informed player who observes the successive realizations of (ωm), and
picks a new belief qm+1 ∈ ∆(S) for the uninformed player, as a (random) function µm of
the earlier beliefs qm = (q0, . . . , qm) and of the realized state ωm+1 in stage m + 1. The
distribution µ ◦P is the induced distribution over sequences of beliefs and states.
Lemma 5. Let Q be a probability distribution over ∆(S)N such that Q-a.s., q0 = q and that
E[qm+1 | q
m] =T Πqm for each m.
Then there exists a sequence µ = (µm) such that the probability measure µ ◦ P satisfies
C1 and C2 below.
C1 The marginal of µ ◦P over ∆(S)N is Q.
C2 For each m ≥ 0, qm is (a version of) the conditional law of ωm given q
m.
The proof of Lemma 5 is in the Appendix. We now construct a behavior strategy σ1 of
player 1 in Gn(p). We let α : ∆(S)→ ∆(A) be a (measurable) function such that α(p˜) is an
optimal strategy of player 1 in the one-shot, average game Γ(p˜), for each p˜ ∈ ∆(S).
For k ≥ 0, we set s
(n)
k := sk/n and p
(n)
k := pk/n. The sequence (s
(n)
k )k∈N is a Markov chain
with transition function P1/n and initial distribution p. We let (µk)k∈N be the transition
functions obtained by applying Lemma 5 with ωk := s
(n)
k and qk := p
(n)
k .
According to σ1, player 1 picks p
(n)
k+1 ∈ ∆(S) according to µk(p
(n)
0 , . . . , p
(n)
k , s
(n)
k+1; ·) then
plays the mixed action α(p
(n)
k+1) ∈ ∆(A).
Let σ2 be an arbitrary strategy of player 2 in Gn(p). For any given stage k, one has
E[g(s
(n)
k , ak, bk)] = E
[
E
[
g(s
(n)
k , ak, bk) | p
(n)
0 , . . . , p
(n)
k
]]
= E
[
E
[
g(s
(n)
k , α(p
(n)
k ), bk) | p
(n)
0 , . . . , p
(n)
k
]]
= E
[
E
[
g(p
(n)
k , α(p
(n)
k ), bk) | p
(n)
0 , . . . , p
(n)
k
]]
≥ E
[
E
[
u(p
(n)
k ) | p
(n)
0 , . . . , p
(n)
k
]]
= E[u(p
(n)
k )].
Summing over k, and denoting by t 7→ p
(n)
t the step process equal to p k
n
over the interval
[ k
n
, k+1
n
), one has therefore
v˜n(p) ≥ E
[∫ ∞
0
re−rtu(p
(n)
t )dt
]
. (10)
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Since (pt) is ca`dla`g, the map t 7→ pt has P-a.s. at most countably many discontinuity
points. Note also that limn p
(n)
t = pt at every continuity point. Thus, one has limn p
(n)
t = pt
P⊗ Leb-a.s. . By dominated convergence, this implies
lim
n→+∞
E
∫ ∞
0
re−rtu(p
(n)
t )dt = E
∫ ∞
0
re−rtu(pt)dt.
By (10), one thus has
lim inf
n→+∞
v˜n(p) ≥ E
∫ ∞
0
e−rtu(pt)dt.
4.2 Step 2
Let n ∈ N∗, and σ1 be an arbitrary strategy of player 1. We adapt Aumann and Maschler
(1995), and construct a reply σ2 of player 2 recursively. Together with σ1, the strategy
σ2 induces a probability distribution over plays of the game, denoted Pσ. Given a stage
k, we denote by pk := Pσ(sk/n = · | H
II
k ) the belief of player 2 at the beginning of stage
k, where HIIk is the information available to player 2, that is, the σ-algebra generated by
(ai, bi)i=1,...,k−1.
5 We let σ2 play in stage k a best reply in the average, one-shot game Γ(pk)
to the conditional distribution of ak given H
II
k .
We introduce the belief p˜k := P(sk/n = · | H
II
k+1) held by player 2 at the end of stage k
(that is, after observing ak), so that pk+1 =
T P1/np˜k.
By Lemmas 2.5 and 2.6 in Mertens, Sorin and Zamir (1994), one has6
E[g(sk/n, ak, bk) | H
II
k ] ≤ u(pk) + E
[
|pk − p˜k|1 | H
II
k
]
.
Taking expectations and summing over stages, one obtains
E
[
λn
∞∑
k=0
(1− λn)
kgk
]
≤ E
[
λn
∞∑
k=0
(1− λn)
ku(pk)
]
+ E
[
λn
∞∑
k=0
(1− λn)
k|pk − p˜k|1
]
(11)
We now introduce a process (p¯t) in S(p) defined by p¯k/n = pk and p¯t =
T Pt− k
n
p¯k/n for each k
and t ∈ [ k
n
, k+1
n
).
Choose a constant c > 0 such that |p¯t − p¯k/n|1 ≤
c
n
for each k, n ∈ N∗ and t ∈ [ k
n
, k+1
n
).
We first bound the first term on the right-hand side of (11):
E
[
λn
∞∑
k=0
(1− λn)
k−1u(pk)
]
≤ E
[∫ ∞
0
re−rtu(p¯t)dt
]
+ sup
t≥0
|u(p¯t)− u(p¯ 1
n
⌊nt⌋)|.
5The belief pk is used to define σ2 in stage k, and the computation of pk uses the definition of σ2 in the
first k − 1 stages only. Hence, there is no circularity.
6denoting by | · |1 the L
1-norm on ∆(S).
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Since u is Lipschitz for the L1-norm, one has, for some C,
E
[
λn
∞∑
k=0
(1− λn)
ku(pk)
]
≤ sup
(pt)∈S(p)
E
[∫ ∞
0
re−rtu(pt)dt
]
+
C
n
.
Next, adapting Mertens Sorin and Zamir (1994), one has
E
[
λn
∞∑
k=0
(1− λn)
k|pk − p˜k|1
]
=
∑
s∈S
λn
∞∑
k=0
(1− λn)
kE [|pk(s)− p˜k(s)|]
≤
∑
s∈S
(
λn
∞∑
k=0
(1− λn)
kE
[
|pk(s)− p˜k(s)|
2
]) 12
=
∑
s∈S
(
λn
∞∑
k=0
(1− λn)
k
(
E(p2k(s))− E(p˜
2
k(s))
)) 12
,
which is also equal to
∑
s∈S
(
λn
∞∑
k=0
(1− λn)
k
(
E(p2k(s))− E(p
2
k+1(s)) + E(p
2
k+1(s))− E(p˜
2
k(s))
)) 12
.
Therefore
E
[
λn
∞∑
k=0
(1− λn)
k|pk − p˜k|1
]
≤
∑
s∈S
(
λn + λn
∞∑
k=0
(1− λn)
kE
(
p2k+1(s)− p˜
2
k(s)
)) 12
≤ |S|
(
λn +
2c
n
) 1
2
.
Plugging into (11), and since σ1 is arbitrary, this yields
v˜n(p) ≤ sup
(pt)∈S(p)
E
[∫ ∞
0
re−rtu(pt)dt
]
+
C
n
+ |S|
(
λn +
2c
n
) 1
2
,
and the inequality lim sup
n→∞
v˜n(p) ≤ sup
(pt)∈S(p)
E
[∫ ∞
0
re−rtu(pt)dt
]
follows.
4.3 Step 3
We conclude by proving that the supremum in P1 is reached. First we remark that the
claim P1 can alternatively be written as
v(p) = max
P∈Σ(p)
EP
[∫ +∞
0
re−rtu(pt)dt
]
,
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where, if Ω denotes the set of ca`dla`g functions from R+ to ∆(S) and (pt) the canonical
process on Ω, Σ(p) is the set of probability measures P on Ω under which (pt) belongs to
S(p). This reformulation permits us to use classical arguments: We apply the tightness
criterion of Meyer and Zheng (1984). Let (Pn)n be a maximizing sequence for P1. Although
strictly speaking the coordinate process (pt) need not be a quasimartingale, Theorem 4 in
Meyer and Zheng (1984) still applies.7
Denote by P¯ the weak limit of some subsequence of (Pn)n. It is routine to show that
P¯ ∈ S(p). Finally, since the functional E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtu(pt)dt
]
is weak continuous, P¯ is a
maximizer in P1.
5 Games with endogenous transitions
In this section we extend Theorem 1 to games with endogenous transitions. We show that the
limit value exists and is characterized as the unique viscosity solution of a Hamilton-Jacobi
equation.
5.1 Model
We now introduce a more general model in which players control transitions. As before, S is
a finite set of states, A and B are finite action sets and g : S×A×B → R denotes the payoff
function. In contrast with the previous sections, we here assume that the generator depends
on actions : R := (R(s, s′; a, b), s, s′ ∈ S, a ∈ A, b ∈ B), where for all (s, a, b) ∈ S × A× B,
• for all s′ 6= s, R(s, s′; a, b) ≥ 0,
•
∑
s′∈S
R(s, s′; a, b) = 0.
For fixed (a, b) ∈ A×B, we denote by t 7→ Pt(a, b) the transition semi-group of the Markov
chain with transition rates R(·; a, b). Given t ≥ 0, and x ∈ ∆(A), y ∈ ∆(B), we set
Pt(x, y) :=
∑
a∈A,b∈B
x(a)y(b)Pt(a, b).
For n ∈ N∗, Gn(p) now denotes the two-player game with infinitely many stages, where, at
each stage k ∈ N, players first choose actions ak ∈ A and bk ∈ B, the payoff is g(s
(n)
k , ak, bk),
and next s
(n)
k+1 is drawn using P1/n(s
(n)
k , ·; ak, bk).
7One may e.g. consider the laws PT
n
of the coordinate process stopped at T and then use a diagonal
argument. Alternatively, we may apply Theorem 4 directly to the ”damped” process qt := e
−atpt where
a ∈ (0, r), with values in the cone spanned by ∆(S).
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The information structure of the game is as before: player 1 observes past and current
realizations of the states s
(n)
k and both players observe past actions of their opponent, while
payoffs are not observed. As before, the weight of stage k in Gn(p) is λn(1 − λn)
k, with
λn := 1− e
−r/n.
The value of the game Gn(p) is still denoted v˜n(p).
5.2 Viscosity Solutions
In this section, we introduce the Hamilton-Jacobi equation which characterizes the limit
value and we define the notion of weak solution (in the viscosity sense) used in Theorem 1.
We first need to fix some notations. As the partial differential equations encountered
below take place in the simplex ∆(S), we have to define a tangent vector space T∆(S)(p) to
the set ∆(S) at each point p:
T∆(S)(p) :=
{
z = (zs)s∈S ∈ R
|S|, ∃ε > 0, p+ εz ∈ ∆(S), p− εz ∈ ∆(S)
}
.
For instance, if p belongs to the relative interior of ∆(S), one has T∆(S)(p) = {z ∈ R
|S|,
∑
s∈S zs =
0}, while T∆(S)(p) = {0} if p is an extreme point of ∆(S). We also define, for any symmetric
matrix X ∈ R|S|×|S|,
λmax(p,X) := sup
{
〈Xz, z〉
|z|2
, z ∈ T∆(S)(p)\{0}
}
. (12)
By convention λmax(p,X) = −∞ if T∆(S)(p) = {0}. Note that λmax(p,X) is a kind of
maximal eigenvalue of X on the tangent space T∆(S)(p).
Given a continuous map H : ∆(S)×R|S| → R, we consider the Hamilton-Jacobi equation
min
{
rw(p) +H(p,Dw(p)) ; −λmax(p,D
2w(p))
}
= 0 in ∆(S). (13)
Definition 1. A map w : ∆(S) → R is a viscosity subsolution of (13) if it is upper
semicontinuous and if, for any smooth test function φ : R|S| → R such that w−φ has a local
maximum on ∆(S) at a point p ∈ ∆(S), one has
min
{
rw(p) +H(p,Dφ(p)) ; −λmax(p,D
2φ(p))
}
≤ 0 .
A map w : ∆(S)→ R is a viscosity supersolution of (13) if it is lower semicontinuous and
if, for any smooth test function φ : R|S| → R such that w− φ has a local minimum on ∆(S)
at a point p ∈ ∆(S), one has
min
{
rw(p) +H(p,Dφ(p)) ; −λmax(p,D
2φ(p))
}
≥ 0 .
Finally, w : ∆(S)→ R is a viscosity solution of (13) if it is a subsolution and a supersolution
of (13).
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Remark 5. 1) This definition does not exactly match the standard notion of viscosity
solution given, e.g., in Crandall, Ishii and Lions (1992): the reason is that we work with
functions defined on the simplex ∆(S), instead of the entire space. It is not even quite the
same as in recent papers dealing with differential games with incomplete information, see e.g.
Cardaliaguet and Rainer (2009a). In these papers, no private information is ever disclosed
after the initial time and the “dynamics” on the parameter p is simply the evolution of the
belief of the non-informed player. As a consequence, a key property of these games is that
the faces of the simplex are invariant under this dynamics: in terms of PDE, this is expressed
by the fact that the conditions for supersolution only need to be tested in the relative interior
of ∆(S). In the present framework, the variable p has a dynamics (the controlled Markov
chain), which leaves the entire set ∆(S) invariant, but not the faces. As a consequence, the
equations have to hold up to the boundary, as in the so-called state-constraint problems.
2) In the above definitions, one can always replace the assumption that w−φ has a local
maximum or minimum by the condition w−φ has a strict local maximum or minimum (see,
e.g., Crandall et al. (1992)).
Uniqueness for the solution of (25) holds thanks to the following comparison principle,
proved in the appendix. We assume that the Hamiltonian H : ∆(S) × R|S| → R satisfies
the condition:
|H(p, q)−H(p, q′)| ≤ C|q − q′| ∀p ∈ ∆(S), q, q′ ∈ R|S| (14)
as well as
|H(p, q)−H(p′, q)| ≤ C|p− p′|(|q|+ 1) ∀p, p′ ∈ ∆(S), q ∈ R|S| (15)
Theorem 6. Under assumptions (14) and (15), if w1 is a continuous viscosity subsolution
of (13) while w2 is a continuous viscosity supersolution of (13), then w1 ≤ w2 in ∆(S).
In particular, equation (13) has at most one continuous viscosity solution.
Examples: We have already encountered several examples of subsolution and supersolu-
tion for the Hamilton-Jacobi equation (2): for instance, it can be checked that the maps
w(p) :=
∫ ∞
0
re−rtcav u(p∗t )dt in Lemma 1 is a supersolution to (2), while the maps w1(p) :=∫ ∞
0
re−rtu(p∗t )dt and w2(p) :=
∑
s∈S
u(δs)
∫ ∞
0
re−rtp∗t (s)dt in Lemma 2 are subsolutions of
(2). Hence, by P2 and Theorem 6, one has v ≤ w and v ≥ max(w1, w2). This provides an
alternative proof of Lemmas 1 and 2.
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5.3 The convergence result
In the endogenous case, it seems difficult to provide a characterization of lim v˜n of the type
of P1 in Theorem 1. However, characterization P2 still holds:
Theorem 7. The uniform limit lim
n→+∞
v˜n(p) exists and is the unique viscosity solution of the
Hamilton-Jacobi equation (13), where H is now given by
H(p, ξ) = min
x∈∆(A)
max
y∈∆(B)
{
−〈TR(x, y)p, ξ〉 − rg(p, x, y)
}
. (16)
Note that, when the transition are independent of actions, one recovers statement P2 of
Theorem 1 as a particular case. As the map H defined by (16) satisfies conditions (14) and
(15) above, Theorem 6 applies, and equation (13) has at most a unique viscosity solution.
5.4 Proof of Theorem 7
5.4.1 Step 1: dynamic programming principle and regularity
As is well-known, the maps v˜n are (uniformly) Lipschitz on ∆(S), concave and bounded, and
satisfy the following dynamic programming principle:
v˜n(p) = max
x∈(∆(A))S
min
y∈∆(B)
(
λng(p, x, y) + (1− λn)
∑
a∈A, b∈B
x(p)(a)y(b)v˜n(
TP 1
n
(a, b)pˆ(x, a))
)
= min
y∈∆(B)
max
x∈(∆(A))S
(
λng(p, x, y) + (1− λn)
∑
a∈A, b∈B
x(p)(a)y(b)v˜n(
TP 1
n
(a, b)pˆ(x, a))
)
(17)
where x(p)(a) =
∑
s∈S
psxs(a) and, for a ∈ A, pˆ(x, a) :=
(
psxs(a)
x(p)(a)
)
s∈S
is the conditional law of
the state given a:
We will prove that any accumulation point of (v˜n) for the uniform convergence is a
viscosity solution of (13). Since (13) has a unique viscosity solution, this will imply the
uniform convergence of the sequence (v˜n).
We thus consider a uniformly convergent subsequence of (v˜n). We denote by w the
continuous limit, and relabel the subsequence as (v˜n).
5.4.2 Step 2: w is a viscosity supersolution
Let φ be a smooth test function such that w−φ has a strict local minimum on ∆(S) at some
point p¯ ∈ ∆(S). This implies the existence of a sequence (pn) which converges to p¯ and such
that v˜n − φ has a local minimum at pn for any n: namely,
v˜n(p) ≥ φ(p)− φ(pn) + v˜n(pn) for any p ∈ ∆(S). (18)
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As v˜n is concave, the inequality λmax(pn, D
2φ(pn)) ≤ 0 holds by definition of T∆(S)(p¯). Since
T∆(S)(pn) ⊃ T∆(S)(p¯) for n large enough, letting n→ +∞ yields −λmax(p¯, D
2φ(p¯)) ≥ 0.
Let yn ∈ ∆(B) achieve the minimum in (17) for v˜n(pn), so that
v˜n(pn) = max
x∈(∆(A))S
(
λng(pn, x, yn) + (1− λn)
∑
a∈A, b∈B
x(pn)(a)yn(b)v˜n(
TP 1
n
(a, b)pˆn(x, a))
)
Up to a subsequence, still denoted (yn), we may assume that (yn) converges to some y ∈
∆(B).
Let now x ∈ ∆(S) be arbitrary. Applying the latter equation with the non-revealing
strategy (x, . . . , x) ∈ ∆(A)S, one has (with some abuse of notation) x(pn) = x and pˆn(x, a) =
pn, hence
v˜n(pn) ≥ λng(pn, x, yn) + (1− λn)
∑
a∈A, b∈B
x(a)yn(b)v˜n(
TP 1
n
(a, b)pn) .
Using (18), this yields
v˜n(pn) ≥ (1− λn) (−φ(pn) + v˜n(pn))
+λng(pn, x, yn) + (1− λn)
∑
a∈A, b∈B
x(a)yn(b)φ(
TP 1
n
(a, b)pn) (19)
Since P 1
n
(a, b) = I + 1
n
T
R(a, b) + o( 1
n
),
φ(TP 1
n
(a, b)pn) = φ(pn) +
1
n
〈TR(a, b)pn, Dφ(pn)〉+ o(
1
n
) .
Since λn = 1− e
− r
n =
r
n
+ o(
1
n
), the inequality (19) can then be rewritten
0 ≥ −rv˜n(pn) + rg(pn, x, yn) +
∑
a∈A, b∈B
x(a)yn(b)〈
TR(a, b)pn, Dφ(pn)〉+ o(1) .
Letting n → +∞ then yields 0 ≥ −rw(p¯) + rg(p¯, x, y) + 〈TR(x, y)p¯, Dφ(p¯)〉. Taking the
infimum over x ∈ ∆(A) gives:
rw(p¯) + max
y∈∆(B)
min
x∈∆(A)
{
−rg(p¯, x, y)− 〈TR(x, y)p¯, Dφ(p¯)〉
}
≥ 0 .
In conclusion we have proved that
min
{
rw(p¯) +H(p¯, Dφ(p¯)) ; −λmax(p¯, D
2φ(p¯))
}
≥ 0 ,
as desired.
21
5.4.3 Step 3: w is a viscosity subsolution
We will use the following technical remark, which follows from Cardaliaguet and Rainer
(2009a) or from Step 1 in the proof of Proposition 4.4 in Gru¨n (2012):
Lemma 6. Let w : ∆(S) → R be a concave function and φ be a smooth test function such
that w− φ has a local maximum on ∆(S) at a point p¯ ∈ ∆(S). If λmax(p¯, D
2φ(p¯)) < 0, then
there is δ > 0 such that, for any p ∈ ∆(S) such that p− p¯ ∈ T∆(S)(p¯),
w(p) ≤ w(p¯) + 〈Dφ(p¯), p− p¯〉 − δ|p− p¯|2. (20)
Let φ be a smooth test function such that w − φ has a strict local maximum on ∆(S)
at some point p¯ ∈ ∆(S). If λmax(p¯, D
2φ(p¯)) ≥ 0, then the desired inequality holds. So we
may assume that λmax(p¯, D
2φ(p¯)) < 0 and it remains to check that, in this case, rw(p¯) +
H(p¯, Dφ(p¯)) ≤ 0 .
As before there are pn ∈ ∆(S) which converge to p¯ and at which v˜n − φ has a local
maximum. Let now xn = (xn,s) achieve the maximum in (17) for v˜n(pn). Given an arbitrary
y ∈ ∆(B), one thus has
v˜n(pn) ≤ λng(pn, xn, y) + (1− λn)
∑
a∈A, b∈B
xn(pn)(a)y(b)v˜n(
TP 1
n
(a, b)pˆn(xn, a)). (21)
Since λn = o(1), since
TP 1
n
(a, b)pˆn(xn, a) = pˆn(xn, a)+o(1), and using the uniform continuity
of v˜n, this implies
o(1) ≤
∑
a∈A, b∈B
xn(pn)(a)y(b) (v˜n(pˆn(xn, a))− v˜n(pn))
Let x = (xs)s∈S be the limit of (a subsequence of) (xn)n. Letting n → +∞ in the above
inequality we get
0 ≤
∑
a∈A, b∈B
x(p¯)(a)y(b) (w(pˆ(x, a))− w(p¯))
=
∑
a∈A
x(p¯)(a) (w(pˆ(x, a))− w(p¯))
(22)
As
∑
a∈A
x(p¯)(a)pˆ(x, a) = p¯, all the points8 pˆ(x, a) belong to the same face of ∆(S) as p¯. Hence
pˆ(x, a)− p¯ ∈ T∆(S)(p¯) for any a ∈ A. Since w−φ has a local maximum on ∆(S) at p¯ ∈ ∆(S)
with λmax(p¯, D
2φ(p¯)) < 0, Lemma 6 states that there is δ > 0 such that, for all p ∈ ∆(S)
with p− p¯ ∈ T∆(S)(p¯),
w(p) ≤ w(p¯) + 〈Dφ(p¯), p− p¯〉 − δ|p− p¯|2. (23)
8such that x(p¯)(a) > 0
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Plugging (23) into (22) gives
0 ≤
∑
a∈A
x(p¯)(a)
(
〈Dφ(p¯), pˆn(xn, a)− p¯〉 − δ|pˆn(xn, a)− p¯|
2
)
= −δ
∑
a∈A
x(p¯)(a)|pˆn(xn, a)− p¯|
2,
because
∑
a∈A
x(p¯)(a)pˆn(xn, a) = p¯. In particular, pˆ(x, a) = p¯ if x(p¯)(a) > 0. By definition
of x(p¯)(a), we have therefore xs = xs′ for any s 6= s
′ such that p¯s > 0 and p¯s′ > 0 (which
means that x is non revealing). We denote by x ∈ ∆(A) this common value and note that
pˆ(x, a) = p¯ whenever x(a) > 0.
We now come back to (21) and use the concavity of v˜n to deduce that
v˜n(pn) ≤ λng(pn, xn, y) + (1− λn)v˜n
( ∑
a∈A, b∈B
xn(pn)(a)y(b)
TP 1
n
(a, b)pˆn(xn, a)
)
Since v˜n − φ has a strict local maximum at pn ∈ ∆(S), we get
0 ≤ λn (g(pn, xn, y)− v˜n(pn))
+ (1− λn)
(
φ
( ∑
a∈A, b∈B
xn(pn)(a)y(b)
TP 1
n
(a, b)pˆn(xn, a)
)
− φ(pn)
)
(24)
Observe next that∑
a∈A, b∈B
xn(pn)(a)y(b)
TP 1
n
(a, b)pˆn(xn, a) = pn +
1
n
∑
a∈A, b∈B
xn(pn)(a)y(b)
TR(a, b)pˆn(xn, a) + o(
1
n
)
= pn +
1
n
∑
a∈A, b∈B
xn(pn)(a)y(b)
TR(a, b)p¯ + o(
1
n
)
where the second equality holds because pˆn(xn, a)→ p¯. Plugging into in (24) we obtain
0 ≤ λn (g(pn, xn, y)− v˜n(pn)) +
(1− λn)
n
〈
Dφ(pn),
∑
a∈A, b∈B
xn(pn)(a)y(b)
TR(a, b)p¯
〉
+ o(
1
n
)
Since xn(pn)(a)→ x(a), multiplying by n and letting n→ +∞ yields
0 ≤ r (g(p¯, x, y)− w(p¯)) +
〈
Dφ(p¯),
∑
a∈A, b∈B
x(a)y(b)TR(a, b)p¯
〉
When rearranging, we find that
rw(p¯) + min
x∈∆(A)
max
y∈∆(B)
(
−rg(p¯, x, y)− 〈Dφ(p¯),TR(x, y)p¯〉
)
≤ 0 .
Therefore w is a subsolution.
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6 Incomplete information on both sides
6.1 Model
The approach developed in the previous section can also be adapted to games with lack of
information on both sides, in which each player observes and controls a Markov chain. The
framework is close to the one of Gensbittel and Renault (2012). In particular, we also assume
that each player observes only one Markov chain. However, the fact that players play more
and more often completely changes the nature of the results.
We assume that there are two controlled Markov chains (s1t ) and (s
2
t ) with values in the
finite sets S1 and S2 respectively. The process (sit) is observed and controlled by Player
i = 1, 2. That is, the generator of (s1t )t≥0 is of the form (R
1(s, s′; a), s, s′ ∈ S1, a ∈ A), and
that of (s2t ) is (R
2(s, s′; b), s, s′ ∈ S1, b ∈ B). The assumptions on R1 and R2 are the same
as in the previous section.
Much as before, for given a, we denote by P 1t (a) the transition function of a Markov
chain with transition rates R1(·; a), and set P 1t (x) :=
∑
a∈A x(a)P
1
t (a) whenever x ∈ ∆(A).
The transition function P 2t (y) is defined similarly for y ∈ ∆(B).
In this new game, the payoff function depends on both states and actions: g : S1 × S2 ×
A × B → R. The initial positions s10 and s
2
0 of the chains are chosen independently with
laws p1 ∈ ∆(S) and p2 ∈ ∆(S2). As before, the weight of stage k in Gn(p) is λn(1 − λn)
k,
with λn := 1 − e
−r/n. The value of the game with initial distribution (p1, p2) is denoted by
v˜n(p
1, p2).
6.2 The Hamilton-Jacobi equation
In this setting, we have to introduce a slightly new type of Hamilton-Jacobi equation. The
Hamiltonian is now a map H : ∆(S1) × ∆(S2) × R|S
1|+|S2| → R and the Hamilton-Jacobi
equation is given by the pair of inequalities
max
{
min
{
rw +H(p1, p2, Dw);−λmax(p
1, D211w)
}
;−λmin(p
2, D222w)
}
≤ 0
in ∆(S1)×∆(S2) ,
min
{
max
{
rw +H(p1, p2, Dw);−λmin(p
2, D222w)
}
;−λmax(p
1, D211w)
}
≥ 0
in ∆(S1)×∆(S2) .
(25)
In the above expressions, r > 0 is the discount rate, w : ∆(S1)×∆(S2)→ R is the unknown
(formally extended to a neighborhood of ∆(S1) × ∆(S2)), Dw = (D1w,D2w) is the full
gradient of w with respect to (p1, p2), D1w (resp. D2w) being the derivative with respect to
p1 (resp. p2), D
2
11w (resp. D
2
22w) is the second order derivative of w with respect to p
1 (resp.
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p2), λmax(p
1, X) is defined by (12) while
λmin(p
2, X) = inf
{
〈Xz, z〉
|z|2
, z ∈ T∆(S2)(p
2)\{0}
}
(26)
where T∆(S2)(p
2) is the tangent space of ∆(S2) at p2. By convention we set λmin(p
2, X) = +∞
if T∆(S2)(p
2) = {0}.
As before, one cannot expect equation (25) to have a smooth solution in general, and we
use instead the following notion of viscosity solution:
Definition 2. A map w : ∆(S1) × ∆(S2) → R is a viscosity subsolution of (25) if it is
upper semicontinuous and if, for any smooth test function φ : R|S
1|+|S2| → R such that w−φ
has a local maximum on ∆(S1)×∆(S2) at (p1, p2) ∈ ∆(S1)×∆(S2), one has
max
{
min
{
rw(p1, p2) +H(p1, p2, Dφ(p1, p2)) ; −λmax(p
1, D211φ(p
1, p2))
}
;
−λmin(p
2, D222φ(p
1, p2))
}
≤ 0 .
A map w : ∆(S1) ×∆(S2) → R is a viscosity supersolution of (25) if it is lower semicon-
tinuous and if, for any smooth test function φ : R|S
1|+|S2| → R such that w − φ has a local
minimum on ∆(S1)×∆(S2) at (p1, p2) ∈ ∆(S1)×∆(S2), one has
min
{
max
{
rw(p1, p2) +H(p1, p2, Dφ(p1, p2)) ; −λmin(p
2, D222φ(p
1, p2))
}
;
−λmax(p
1, D211φ(p
1, p2))
}
≥ 0 .
Finally, w : ∆(S1) × ∆(S2) → R is a viscosity solution of (25) if it is a sub- and a
supersolution of (25).
Uniqueness of a viscosity solution for (25) holds thanks to a comparison principle, which
generalizes Theorem 6. We will assume that H : ∆(S1) × ∆(S2) ×R|S
1|+|S2| → R satisfies
the condition:
|H(p, q)−H(p, q′)| ≤ C|q − q′| ∀p ∈ ∆(S1)×∆(S2), q, q′ ∈ R|S
1|+|S2| (27)
as well as
|H(p, q)−H(p′, q)| ≤ C|p− p′|(|q|+ 1) ∀p, p′ ∈ ∆(S1)×∆(S2), q ∈ R|S
1|+|S2| (28)
Theorem 8. Assume that (27) and (28) hold. Let w1 be a continuous viscosity subsolution of
(25) and w2 be a continuous viscosity supersolution of (25). Then w1 ≤ w2 in ∆(S
1)×∆(S2).
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6.3 The limit theorem
Here is our main result in the framework of lack of information on both sides.
Theorem 9. The uniform limit v = lim
n→+∞
v˜n exists and is the unique viscosity solution of
Hamilton-Jacobi equation (25) where H is given by
H(p1, p2, ξ1, ξ2) = min
x∈∆(A)
max
y∈∆(B)
{
−〈TR1(x)p1, ξ1〉 − 〈TR2(y)p2, ξ2〉 − rg(p1, p2, x, y)
}
= max
y∈∆(B)
min
x∈∆(A)
{
−〈TR1(x)p1, ξ1〉 − 〈TR2(y)p2, ξ2〉 − rg(p1, p2, x, y)
}
(29)
for any (p1, p2, ξ1, ξ2) ∈ ∆(S1)×∆(S2)×R|S
1| ×R|S
2|.
Note that the Hamiltonian defined in (29) satisfies conditions (27) and (28). So equation
(25) has at most one viscosity solution.
6.4 Proof of Theorem 9
The proof is close to the one for Theorem 7. The main difference is that we have to deal
with the fact that both players now have private information, which complicates the proof
of the viscosity solution property. On the other hand, the problem is now symmetrical, so
that it is enough to show the supersolution property, the argument for the subsolution being
identical.
6.4.1 Step 1: Dynamic programming principle and regularity
For (p1, p2) ∈ ∆(S1)×∆(S2), (x, y) ∈ (∆(A))|S
1| × (∆(B))|S
2| and (a, b) ∈ A×B, we set
x(p1)(a) =
∑
s∈S1
p1sxs(a) and y(p
2)(b) =
∑
s∈S2
p2sys(b)
and pˆ1(x, a) :=
(
p1sxs(a)
x(p1)(a)
)
s∈S1
and pˆ2(y, b) :=
(
p2sys(b)
x(p2)(b)
)
s∈S2
denote the conditional dis-
tributions of the states given a and b respectively.
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The dynamic programming principle for v˜n reads
v˜n(p
1, p2)
= max
x∈(∆(A))|S
1|
min
y∈(∆(B))|S
2|
(
λng(p
1, p2, x, y)
+(1− λn)
∑
a∈A, b∈B
x(p1)(a)y(p2)(b)v˜n(
TP 11
n
(a)pˆ1(x, a),TP 21
n
(b)pˆ2(y, b))
)
= min
y∈(∆(B))|S2|
max
x∈(∆(A))|S1|
(
λng(p
1, p2, x, y)
+(1− λn)
∑
a∈A, b∈B
x(p1)(a)y(p2)(b)v˜n(
TP 11
n
(a)pˆ1(x, a),TP 21
n
(b)pˆ2(y, b))
)
(30)
As before, the maps v˜n are uniformly Lipschitz and bounded, and we will prove that any
(uniform) accumulation point of the sequence (v˜n) is a viscosity solution of (25). Again up
to a subsequence, we may assume that (v˜n) converges to some continuous map w.
6.4.2 Step 2: w is a viscosity supersolution
Let φ be a smooth test function such that w−φ has a strict local minimum on ∆(S1)×∆(S2)
at some point (p¯1, p¯2) ∈ ∆(S1)×∆(S2). From standard arguments, this implies the existence
of a sequence (p1n, p
2
n) which converges to (p¯
1, p¯2) and such that v˜n − φ has a local minimum
at (p1n, p
2
n) for any n: namely,
v˜n(p
1, p2) ≥ φ(p1, p2)− φ(p1n, p
2
n) + v˜n(p
1
n, p
2
n) for any (p
1, p2) ∈ ∆(S1)×∆(S2). (31)
As v˜n is concave in p
1, we must have λmax(p
1
n, D
2
11φ(p
1
n, p
2
n)) ≤ 0 by definition of T∆(S1)(p
1
n).
Since T∆(S1)(p
1
n) ⊃ T∆(S1)(p¯
1) for n large enough, we get, as n→ +∞:
−λmax(p¯
1, D211φ(p¯
1, p¯2)) ≥ 0.
It remains to check that
max
{
rw(p¯1, p¯2) +H(p¯1, p¯2, Dφ(p¯1, p¯2)) ; −λmin(p¯
2, D222φ(p¯
1, p¯2))
}
≥ 0 .
For this we assume that λmin(p¯
2, D222φ(p¯
1, p¯2)) > 0 and we are left to prove that
rw(p¯1, p¯2) +H(p¯1, p¯2, Dφ(p¯1, p¯2)) ≥ 0 .
Let yn ∈ (∆(B))
|S2| be optimal in the dynamic programming equation (30) for v˜n(pn):
v˜n(p
1
n, p
2
n) = max
x∈(∆(A))|S
1|
(
λng(p
1
n, p
2
n, x, yn)
+(1− λn)
∑
a∈A, b∈B
x(p1n)(a)yn(p
2
n)(b)v˜n(
TP 11
n
(a)pˆ1n(x, a),
TP 21
n
(b)pˆ2n(y, b))
)
.
Let y = (ys)s∈S2 be the limit of (a subsequence of) (yn). Fix x ∈ ∆(A). (With a slight
abuse of notation), if Player 1 plays the non-revealing strategy (x, . . . , x) ∈ (∆(A))|S
1|, we
get x(p1n) = x and pˆ
1
n(x, a) = p
1
n and therefore
v˜n(p
1
n, p
2
n) ≥ λng(p
1
n, p
2
n, x, yn)
+(1− λn)
∑
a∈A, b∈B
x(a)yn(p
2
n)(b)v˜n(
TP 11
n
(a)p1n,
TP 21
n
(b)pˆ2n(y, b)) . (32)
Recalling that λn = o(1), that
TP 11
n
(a, b)p1n = p
1
n + o(1) and that
TP 11
n
(a, b)pˆ2n(yn, b) =
pˆ2n(yn, b) + o(1), we get, letting n→ +∞ in (32),
w(p¯1, p¯2) ≥
∑
b∈B
y(p¯2)(b)w(p¯1, pˆ2(y, b)) . (33)
From (33) we conclude as in the proof of Theorem 7 that pˆ2(y, b) = p¯2 if y(p2)(b) > 0.
Coming back to the definition of y(p2)(b) > 0, we have therefore that ys = ys′ for any s 6= s
′
such that p¯2s > 0 and p¯
2
s′ > 0: this means that y is non revealing. We denote by y ∈ ∆(B)
this common value and note that pˆ2(y, b) = p¯ whenever y(b) > 0.
With this in mind, we come back to (32), which becomes, since v˜n is convex in p
2, and
since the dynamics of (s1t ) is independent of Player 2:
v˜n(p
1
n, p
2
n) ≥ λng(p
1
n, p
2
n, x, yn)
+(1− λn)
∑
a∈A
x(a)v˜n
(
TP 11
n
(a)p1n,
∑
b∈B
yn(p
2
n)(b)
TP 21
n
(b)pˆ2n(y, b)
)
.
We next use the fact that v˜n − φ has a local minimum at (p
1
n, p
2
n):
0 ≥ λn
(
g(p1n, p
2
n, x, yn)− v˜n(p
1
n, p
2
n)
)
+(1− λn)
∑
a∈A
x(a)
(
φ(TP 11
n
(a)p1n,
∑
b∈B
yn(p
2
n)(b)
TP 21
n
(b)pˆ2n(y, b))− φ(p
1
n, p
2
n)
)
(34)
where
TP 11
n
(a)p1n = p
1
n +
1
n
TR1(a)p1n + o(
1
n
)
while, as
∑
b∈B
yn(p
2
n)(b)pˆ
2
n(y, b) = p
2
n,
∑
b∈B
yn(p
2
n)(b)
TP 21
n
(b)pˆ2n(y, b) = p
2
n +
1
n
∑
b∈B
yn(p
2
n)(b)
TR2(b)pˆ2n(y, b) + o(
1
n
).
Multiplying (34) by n and letting n→ +∞ gives therefore
0 ≥ r
(
g(p¯1, p¯2, x, y)− w(p¯1, p¯2)
)
+
∑
a∈A
x(a)
〈
Dφ(p¯1, p¯2),
(
TR1(a)p¯1,
∑
b∈B
y(b) TR2(b)p¯2
)
〉 .
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Rearranging we find that
rw(p¯) + min
x∈∆(A)
max
y∈∆(B)
(
−g(p¯1, p¯2, x, y)− 〈Dφ(p¯), (TR1(x)p¯1,TR2(y)p¯2)〉
)
≥ 0 .
Therefore w is a supersolution.
A Technical results
A.1 Proof of Lemma 5
Let a probability measure Q over ∆(S)dN be as stated. Generic elements of (∆(S) × S)N
are denoted (qm, sm)m∈N. To avoid multiplying notations, and at the cost of a notational
abuse, we will write Q(qm; qm+1) for the conditional law of qm+1 given q
m. Given a proba-
bility measure P˜ over (∆(S)× S)N, we similarly write P˜(qm, sm; qm+1, sm+1) for the law of
(qm+1, sm+1) given (q
m, sm), P˜(q
m, sm, sm+1; qm+1) for the law of qm+1 given (q
m, sm, sm+1),
etc., with semi-colons separating conditioning variables from the others.
For m ≥ 1, denote by θm the transition function from ∆(S)
m×S to ∆(S)×S defined by
θm(q
m;F, sm+1) =
∫
F
qm+1(sm+1)Q(q
m; dqm+1). (35)
Intuitively, θm(q
m; qm+1, sm+1) is the probability obtained when first choosing qm+1 according
to its (conditional) law Q(qm; qm+1), then picking sm+1 according to qm+1, and we define the
sequence µ = (µm) by
µm(q
m, sm+1;F ) :=
θm(q
m;F, sm+1)
θm(qm; sm+1)
,
so that µm(q
m, sm+1; qm+1) is “the conditional law of qm+1 given q
m and sm+1”.
We now prove by induction that the induced distribution µ◦P over (∆(S)×S)N satisfies
C1 and C2. We thus assume that for some m, (i) the conditional law of qm given q
m−1
(under µ ◦P) is equal to Q(qm−1; qm), (ii) the conditional law of sm given q
m is equal to qm,
and prove that (i) and (ii) also hold for m+ 1.
For F ⊆ ∆(S), note first that by (ii), one has
µ◦P(qm; qm+1 ∈ F ) =
∑
sm∈S
µ◦P(qm, sm;F )qm(sm) =
∑
sm,sm+1∈S
µ◦P(qm, sm;F, sm+1)qm(sm).
Since µ ◦P(qm, sm;F, sm+1) = µm(q
m, sm+1;F )pi(sm+1 | sm) by definition, one also has
µ ◦P(qm; qm+1 ∈ F ) =
∑
sm,sm+1
θm(q
m;F, sm+1)
θm(qm; sm+1)
qm(sm)pi(sm+1 | sm).
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Observe next that, by the induction assumption, since E[qm+1 | q
m] =T Πqm and since
sm+1 and q
m are conditionally independent given sm, one has
θm(q
m; sm+1) =
∑
sm
qm(sm)pi(sm+1 | sm).
Hence
µ ◦P(qm;F ) =
∑
sm+1
θm(q
m; sm+1, F ) = Q(q
m;F ), (36)
as desired.
We now prove that µ ◦ P(qm, qm+1; sm+1) = qm+1(sm+1). One has (beware of the semi-
colons)
µ ◦P(qm, qm+1; sm+1) =
µ ◦P(qm; qm+1, sm+1)
µ ◦P(qm; qm+1)
=
µ ◦P(qm, sm+1; qm+1)µ ◦P(q
m; sm+1)
Q(qm; qm+1)
(37)
using (conditional) Bayes laws and (36). Observe next that
µ ◦P(qm, sm+1; qm+1) = µm(q
m, sm+1; qm+1)
=
θm(q
m; qm+1, sm+1)
θm(qm; sm+1)
and
µ ◦P(qm; sm+1) =
∑
sm
µ ◦P(qm; sm, sm+1)
=
∑
sm
µ ◦P(qm; sm), sm+1)× µ ◦P(q
m, sm; sm+1)
=
∑
sm
qm(sm)pi(sm+1 | sm) = E[qm+1(sm+1) | q
m],
where the second equality holds by (9). Plugging into (37), this yields
µ ◦P(qm, qm+1; sm+1) =
θm(q
m; qm+1, sm+1)
θm(qm; sm+1)
×
E[qm+1(sm+1) | q
m]
θm(qm; qm+1)
.
To conclude, recall that (see (35))
θm(q
m; qm+1, sm+1) = θm(q
m; qm+1)qm+1(sm+1),
while
θm(qm; sm+1) =
∫
∆(S)
qm+1(sm+1)Q(q
m; dqm+1) = E[qm+1(sm+1) | q
m],
so that µ ◦P(qm, qm+1; sm+1) = qm+1(sm+1), as desired.
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A.2 Proof of the comparison principle
In this section we prove Theorem 8 (which implies Theorem 6). We follow here the proof of
Crandall, Ishii and Lions (1992) for second order Hamilton-Jacobi equations. However their
results do not apply directly, because the terms λmin and λmax introduce a strong degeneracy
in the equation. This issue is also present in Cardaliaguet and Rainer (2009a), where it is
dealt with by an induction argument over the dimension of the faces of the simplices, which
relies on the fact that the restriction of solutions to faces are still solutions. This is no longer
the case here. This forces us to revisit the proof, and to come back to the basic technique
consisting in regularizing the solutions by inf- or sup convolution, and then in using Jensen
Lemma.
Let w1 be a subsolution and w2 be a supersolution of (25). Our aim is to show that
w1 ≤ w2. We argue by contradiction, and assume that
M := sup
p∈∆(S1)×∆(S2)
{w1(p)− w2(p)} > 0 . (38)
In order to use the special structure of the problem, we have to regularize the maps w1
and w2 by sup and inf-convolution respectively. This technique is standard and we refer to
Crandall, Ishii and Lions (1992) for details. For δ > 0 and p ∈ R|S
1|+|S2| we set
wδ1(p) = max
p′∈∆(S1)×∆(S2)
{
w1(p
′)−
1
2δ
|p− p′|2
}
and
w2,δ(p) = min
p′∈∆(S1)×∆(S2)
{
w2(p
′) +
1
2δ
|p− p′|2
}
We note for later use that wδ1 and w2,δ are now defined over the entire space R
|S1|+|S2|, that
wδ1 is semiconvex while w2,δ is semiconcave (see Crandall et al (1992)). Moreover,
lim
|p|→+∞
|p|−1wδ1(p) = −∞, lim
|p|→+∞
|p|−1w2,δ(p) = +∞ . (39)
Setting
Mδ = sup
p∈R|S
1|+|S2|
{
wδ1(p)− w2,δ(p)
}
(40)
we have:
Lemma 7. For any δ > 0, the problem (40) has at least one maximum point. If pδ is such
a maximum point and if p′δ ∈ ∆(S
1)×∆(S2) and p′′δ ∈ ∆(S
1)×∆(S2) are such that
(i) wδ1(pδ) = w1(p
′
δ)−
1
2δ
|pδ − p
′
δ|
2 and (ii) w2,δ(pδ) = w2(p
′′
δ ) +
1
2δ
|pδ − p
′′
δ |
2 (41)
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then, as δ → 0, Mδ → M while
|pδ − p
′
δ|
2
2δ
+
|pδ − p
′′
δ |
2
2δ
→ 0.
Proof. The existence of a maximum point is a straightforward consequence of (39). The rest
of the statement is classical.
Next we note that wδ1 and w2,δ are still respectively a subsolution and a supersolution of
slightly modified equations:
Lemma 8. Assume that vδ1 has a second order Taylor expansion at a point p. Then
min
{
rwδ1(p) +H(p
′, Dwδ1(p)) ; −λmax((p
′)1, D211w
δ
1(p))
}
≤ 0, (42)
where p′ = ((p′)1, (p′)2) ∈ ∆(S1)×∆(S2) is such that
wδ1(p) = w1(p
′)−
1
2δ
|p− p′|2.
Similarly, if w2,δ has a second order Taylor expansion at a point p, then
max
{
rw2,δ(p) +H(p
′′, Dw2,δ(p)) ; −λmin((p
′′)2, D222w2,δ(p)
}
≥ 0, (43)
where p′′ = ((p′′)1, (p′′)2) ∈ ∆(S1)×∆(S2) is such that
w2,δ(p) = w2(p
′′) +
1
2δ
|p− p′′|2.
Proof. We do the proof for wδ1, the argument for w2,δ being symmetrical. Assume that w
δ
1
has a second order Taylor expansion at a point p¯ and set, for γ > 0 small,
φγ(p) = 〈Dw
δ
1(p¯), p− p¯〉+
1
2
〈D2wδ1(p¯)(p− p¯), p− p¯〉+
γ
2
|p− p¯|2.
We also denote by p¯′ a point in ∆(S1)×∆(S2) such that
wδ1(p¯) = w1(p¯
′)−
1
2δ
|p¯− p¯′|2. (44)
Then wδ1 − φγ has a maximum at p¯, which implies, by definition of w
δ
1, that
w1(p
′)−
1
2δ
|p′ − p|2 ≤ φγ(p)− φγ(p¯) + w
δ
1(p¯) ∀p ∈ R
|S1|×|S2|, p′ ∈ ∆(S1)×∆(S2),
with an equality for (p, p′) = (p¯, p¯′). If we choose p = p′ − p¯′ + p¯ in the above formula, we
get:
w1(p
′) ≤ φγ(p
′ − p¯′ + p¯) +
1
2δ
|p¯′ − p¯|2 − φγ(p¯) + w
δ
1(p¯) ∀p
′ ∈ ∆(S1)×∆(S2),
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with an equality at p′ = p¯′. As w1 is a subsolution, we obtain therefore, using the right-hand
side of the above inequality as a test function,
min
{
rw1(p¯
′) +H(p¯′, Dφγ(p¯)) ; −λmax((p¯
′)1, D211φγ(p¯))
}
≤ 0.
We note that Dφγ(p¯) = Dw
δ
1(p¯), D
2
11φγ(p¯) = D
2wδ1(p¯) + γI and w1(p¯
′) ≥ wδ1(p¯) (by (44)).
So letting γ → 0 we obtain the desired result.
In order to exploit inequalities (42) and (43), we have to produce points at which wδ1
is strictly concave with respect to the first variable while wδ2 is strictly convex with respect
to the second one. For this reason, we introduce a new penalization. For σ > 0 and
p = (p1, p2) ∈ R|S
1|+|S2|, let us set ξ¯1(p
1) = (1 + |p1|2)
1
2 , ξ¯2(p
2) = (1 + |p2|2)
1
2 and
Mδ,σ = sup
p∈R|S
1|+|S2|
{
wδ1(p)− w2,δ(p) + σξ¯1(p
1) + σξ¯2(p
2)
}
Using (39), one easily checks that there exists a maximizer (pˆ1, pˆ2) to the above problem.
In order to use Jensen’s Lemma (Lemma A.3. in Crandall, Ishii and Lions [8]), we need
this maximum to be strict. For this we modify slightly ξ¯1 and ξ¯2: we set, for i = 1, 2,
ξi(p
i) = ξ¯i(p
i)− σ(1 + |pi − pˆi|2)
1
2 . We will choose σ > 0 so small that ξ1 and ξ2 still have a
positive second order derivative. By definition,
Mδ,σ = sup
p∈R|S
1|+|S2|
{
wδ1(p)− w2,δ(p) + σξ1(p
1) + σξ2(p
2)
}
and the above problem has a strict maximum at (pˆ1, pˆ2). As the map p→ wδ1(p)−w2,δ(p) +
σξ1(p
1) + σξ2(p
2) is semiconcave, Jensen’s Lemma states that, for any ε > 0, there is vector
aε ∈ R
|S1|+|S2| with |aε| ≤ ε, such that the problem
Mδ,σ,ε := sup
p∈R|S
1|+|S2|
{
wδ1(p)− w2,δ(p) + σξ1(p
1) + σξ2(p
2) + 〈aε, p〉
}
has a maximum point pδ,σ,ε ∈ R
|S1|+|S2| at which the maps wδ1 and w2,δ have a second order
Taylor expansion. From Lemma 8, we have
min
{
rwδ1(pδ,σ,ε) +H(p
′
δ,σ,ε, Dw
δ
1(pδ,σ,ε)) ; −λmax((p
′
δ,σ,ε)
1, D211w
δ
1(pδ,σ,ε))
}
≤ 0, (45)
and
max
{
rw2,δ(pδ,σ,ε) +H(p
′′
δ,σ,ε, Dw2,δ(pδ,σ,ε)) ; −λmin((p
′′
δ,σ,ε)
2, D222w2,δ(pδ,σ,ε)
}
≥ 0, (46)
where p′δ,σ,ε and p
′′
δ,σ,ε are points in ∆(S
1)×∆(S2) at which one has
wδ1(pδ,σ,ε) = w1(p
′
δ,σ,ε)−
1
2δ
|pδ,σ,ε − p
′
δ,σ,ε|
2 and w2,δ(pδ,σ,ε) = w2(p
′′
δ,σ,ε) +
1
2δ
|pδ,σ,ε − p
′′
δ,σ,ε|
2.
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Note for later use that
Dwδ1(pδ,σ,ε) = −
1
δ
(
pδ,σ,ε − p
′
δ,σ,ε
)
and Dw2,δ(pδ,σ,ε) =
1
δ
(
pδ,σ,ε − p
′′
δ,σ,ε
)
. (47)
By definition of Mδ,σ,ε we have
wδ1(p) ≤Mδ,σ,ε + w2,δ(p)− σ(ξ1(p
1) + ξ2(p
2))〈aε, p〉 ∀p ∈ R
|S1|+|S2|,
with an equality at pδ,σ,ε. Hence
Dwδ1(pδ,σ,ε) = Dw2,δ(pδ,σ,ε)− σ
(
D1ξ1(p
1
δ,σ,ε)
D2ξ2(p
2
δ,σ,ε)
)
− aε (48)
while
D2wδ1(pδ,σ,ε) ≤ D
2w2,δ(pδ,σ,ε)− σ
(
D21,1ξ1(p
1
δ,σ,ε) 0
0 D22,2ξ2(p
2
δ,σ,ε)
)
. (49)
We now check that λmax((p
′
δ,σ,ε)
1, D211w
δ
1(pδ,σ,ε)) < 0. For this, we come back to the definition
of w2,δ and note that, for any p
1 ∈ R|S
1| and (p′)1 ∈ ∆(S1),
w2,δ(p
1, p2δ,σ,ε) ≤ w2((p
′)1, (p′δ,σ,ε)
2) +
1
2δ
(
|p1 − (p′)1|2 + |(pδ,σ,ε)
2 − (p′δ,σ,ε)
2|2
)
,
with an equality at (p1, (p′)1) = ((pδ,σ,ε)
1, (p′δ,σ,ε)
1). If z ∈ T∆(S2)(p
′
δ,σ,ε)
1 with |z| small
enough, taking p1 := (pδ,σ,ε)
1 + z and (p′)1 = (p′δ,σ,ε)
1 + z gives
w2,δ((pδ,σ,ε)
1 + z, p2δ,σ,ε) ≤
w2((p
′
δ,σ,ε)
1 + z, (p′δ,σ,ε)
2) +
1
2δ
(
|(pδ,σ,ε)
1 − (p′δ,σ,ε)
1|2 + |(pδ,σ,ε)
2 − (p′δ,σ,ε)
2|2
)
,
with equality for z = 0. As w2 is concave with respect to the first variable, the above
inequality implies that λmax((p
′
δ,σ,ε)
1, D211w2,δ(pδ,σ,ε)) ≤ 0. In view of (49) we get therefore
λmax((p
′
δ,σ,ε)
1, D211w
δ
1(pδ,σ,ε)) ≤ −σλmin((p
′
δ,σ,ε)
1, D21,1ξ1(p
1
δ,σ,ε)) < 0
because D21,1ξ1 > 0 by contruction. One can check in the same way that
λmin((p
′′
δ,σ,ε)
2, D222w2,δ(pδ,σ,ε) > 0.
So (45) and (46) become
rwδ1(pδ,σ,ε) +H(p
′
δ,σ,ε, Dw
δ
1(pδ,σ,ε)) ≤ 0 (50)
and
rw2,δ(pδ,σ,ε) +H(p
′′
δ,σ,ε, Dw2,δ(pδ,σ,ε)) ≥ 0. (51)
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We compute the difference of the two inequalities:
r(wδ1(pδ,σ,ε)− w2,δ(pδ,σ,ε)) +H(p
′
δ,σ,ε, Dw
δ
1(pδ,σ,ε))−H(p
′′
δ,σ,ε, Dw2,δ(pδ,σ,ε)) ≤ 0,
where, in view of assumption (28) and (47),
H(p′δ,σ,ε, Dw
δ
1(pδ,σ,ε)) ≥ H(pδ,σ,ε, Dw
δ
1(pδ,σ,ε))−
C
δ
∣∣pδ,σ,ε − p′δ,σ,ε∣∣2
while
H(p′′δ,σ,ε, Dw2,δ(pδ,σ,ε)) ≤ H(pδ,σ,ε, Dw2,δ(pδ,σ,ε)) +
C
δ
∣∣pδ,σ,ε − p′′δ,σ,ε∣∣2 .
So
r(wδ1(pδ,σ,ε)− w2,δ(pδ,σ,ε)) +H(pδ,σ,ε, Dw
δ
1(pδ,σ,ε))−H(pδ,σ,ε, Dw2,δ(pδ,σ,ε))
≤
C
δ
(∣∣pδ,σ,ε − p′δ,σ,ε∣∣2 + ∣∣pδ,σ,ε − p′′δ,σ,ε∣∣2) .
We now use assumption (27) on H combined with (48) to deduce:
r(wδ1(pδ,σ,ε)− w2,δ(pδ,σ,ε)) ≤
C
δ
(∣∣pδ,σ,ε − p′δ,σ,ε∣∣2 + ∣∣pδ,σ,ε − p′′δ,σ,ε∣∣2)+ C(ε+ σ), (52)
since Dξ1 and Dξ2 are bounded. As σ and ε tend to 0, the pδ,σ,ε, p
′
δ,σ,ε and p
′′
δ,σ,ε converges
(up to a subsequence) to pδ, p
′
δ and p
′′
δ , where pδ is a maximum in (40) and where p
′
δ and p
′′
δ
satisfy (41). Moreover (52) implies that
rMδ = r(w
δ
1(pδ)− w2,δ(pδ)) ≤
C
δ
(
|pδ − p
′
δ|
2
+ |pδ − p
′′
δ |
2
)
.
We finally let δ → 0: in view of Lemma 7 the above inequality yields toM = limδ→0Mδ ≤ 0,
which contradicts our initial assumption. Therefore w1 ≤ w2 and the proof is complete.
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